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Corporations and structural linkages in
world commerce
John B. Davis and Joseph P. Daniels

The Millennium Round of multilateral negotiations under the auspices of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) confronts international trade and investment issues that are more complex and intractable than those in past rounds
on account of increasing structural and policy interdependencies between the
industrialized nations. Negotiators will have to think not only in terms of
trade and investment between separate nations but also in terms of a system
of production that operates across nations. In previous rounds, liberalizing
international trade dominated the agendas. But international trade and investment have become more highly interlinked in the last decade, so that it has
become difficult to consider trade liberalization apart from capital flows. At
the same time, the issue of liberalizing international financial flows has been
complicated by the massive expansion in the 1990s of portfolio capital flows
and by financial crises in Asia and elsewhere.
This chapter consequently examines international trade and investment
linkages in terms of long-term structural change, tying this to corporate
strategies responding to and underlying this change. Our principal subject is
the theory of international production and the emerging system of international production, and we comment on policy initiatives regarding trade and
investment generated by increased recognition of their interlinked character.
International production has been investigated within at least six branches
of theory: international capital movements, trade, location, industrial organization, innovation, and the firm (Cantwell et al., 1986). Various theories of
international production investigate different questions posed in theoretical
branches they draw upon, some taking macroeconomic and others nllcroeconomic perspectives. The theory of international capital movements and
foreign direct investment (FDI), especially where it bears on balance of
payments and exchange rate effects, has mainly a macroeconomic focus,
whereas the theory of the transnational corporation (TNC) is more microeconomic. Both subjects, however, concern closely related matters, and
accordingly understanding important issues in international production generally requires an eclectic approach, as argued by Dunning (1977, 1981,
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1988). OUf focus is restricted to economics and international business, and

does cover social and cultural issues.

1 CHAPTER OUTLINE
First we describe a number of key structural developments, to portray general
trends in globalization. 1 These structural developments concern: the relation
of world FOI flows to world trade flows; the dominance of Triad trade and
FDI flows in the world economy; the importance of mergers and acquisitions

(M&As) in world FOI; and the geographical and sectoral distribution of FOI
and cross-border M&A. We conclude this section with a discussion of the

relationship between trade and investment as substitutes and/or complements.
Next we tum to TNCs as a principal vehicle of globalization processes,
and explain how the strategies of major firms in the world economy are
shaped by their need to operate in foreign locations. The current state of trade
negotiations has given added importance to international finns expanding

through FOr. We then emphasize that firm search and deliberation costs, as
transaction costs, are particularly important to TNCs, and argue that TNCs
become 'embedded' in host social and business networks as they establish

foreign affiliates. This 'embeddedness' helps to account for the structural
changes and developments described earlier, particularly the concentration of

FOI in the Triad, where business networks are generalJy highly developed. To
illustrate the implications of this for the relationship between trade and investment, we return to the topic of trade and investment as substitutes or
complements, and discuss three cases showing how firms' FDI affects exports

and imports.
Finally, we discuss economic policy toward FDI and TNCs, particularly in
connection with recent unsuccessful efforts to establish the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). We first consider debate about the national loyalties
of TNCs and the impact of liberalized capital flows. We then distinguish
between short-term and long-term investment flows, and argue that liberalization of the latter can be in the interest of host countries as TNCs become

embedded in them. We then discuss the difference between national competitiveness and the competitiveness of a nation's firms, and make a general case

for an international agreement at least along the lines of the MAI. This
section closes with an argument in favour of a collection of piecemeal changes

that taken together will accomplish much of what was intended by the MAl,
and will also create an agenda for more comprehensive reform.
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2 EVIDENCE OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system ushered in' a new era of globalization, with capital market liberalization beginning in the mid-1970s in the
United States and Canada. The process continued, though unevenly, throughout the remainder of the twentieth century as other developed nations began
removing and reducing capital barriers in the 1980s (Williamson and Mahar,
1998). Many developing countries followed suit, although it was a forwardreverse-forward process for some. The risks and rewards became clear as ,the
century came to a close. Long-term capital flows were concentrated in the
developed nations, increasing their global production capacity and providing
access to lucrative consumer markets. Developing and emerging nations gained
jobs created by FDI, but also suffered extreme financial crises created by hotmoney or portfolio flows.
Meanwhile the growth of global trade gradually declined, while foreign
direct investment increased. At the same time, different stages of the production processes moved to different world locations, in a 'disintegration' of
production as a means to greater global integration (Feenstra, 1998). In this
section we focus on developments in trade and capital markets over the last
decade. We present the stylized facts only, relating these patterns to strategies
and theories of transnationals in the following section.

2.1

World FDI Flows Relative to World Trade Flows

In spite of declining transportation costs and f;ldvances in telecommunications
technology, the rate of growth in world exports has decreased during the last
thirty years. As shown in Table 4.1, five-year growth rates in world exports
have declined from a high of 24 per cent in the early 1970s to single digit
gains in the 1990s. The long-delayed conclusion to the Uruguay Round of
Table 4.1

1971-1975
1976-1980
1981-1985
1986-1990
1991-1995
1996-1998
Source:

Periodic growth of world FDI and exports

FDI inflows

FDI outflows

World exports

19.8
18.5
2.1
31.5
11.3
25.6

17.3
17.4
2.4
34.6
9.2
22.8

24
18.1
-0.56
14.5
8.3
2.2

UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2000).

-
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trade negotiations, the loss of Presidential fast-track authority in the United
States, recent WTO skirmishes, and the lack of G7 leadership suggests that
further gains in world trade are more likely to come from regional and
bilateral agreements than from multilateral pacts.
Capital flows have expanded over this same period in a climate of liberalization and gradual hannonization of national tax policies and accounting
rules. FDI rates of growth now significantly surpass trade flow rates of
growth. As illustrated in Table 4.1, the change begins after the worldwide
recession and the Latin American debt crises of the early 1980s. Further
gains in economic liberalization are likely to stem from the expansion of
international production fuelled by high rates of FDI as opposed to increased
multilateral trade liberalization.
2.2

Triad Trade and FDI Flows

Figure 4.1 illustrates Triad and rest-of-world (ROW) shares of world exports.
During the last thirty years, the Triad has consistently contributed 60 to 70
per cent of total world exports. Figure 4.2 shows inward FDI flows for the
Triad and the ROW for the last thirty years. Though the average inward FDI
flow to the Triad is 60 to 70 per cent of the total, these inflows demonstrate a
fair amount of variability, perhaps reflecting the Latin American debt crises
of the 1980s and the financial crises of the late 1990s. and reveal a short-lived

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
1970

1975
1980
1985
1990
1995 1998
l1li NorthAmerica D Europe D Japan l1li Rest of World

Source:

UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2000).

Figure 4.1

World exports: Triad proportion of total
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Figure 4.2

Inward FDI flows: Triad proportion of total

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995 1998
III North America D Europe § Japan l1li Rest of World
Source:

UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2QOO).

Figure 4.3

Outward FDI flows: Triad proportion of total

interest in global capacity diversification in developing economies. Of particular interest is the small fraction of PDI inflows to Japao, indicating the
relatively closed nature of its economy.
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The Triad's share of FDl outflows, shown in Figure 4"3, also demonstrates
greater variability than their export share; with decreases occurring in the

early 1980s and mid-1990s" The thirty-year average of the Triad, however,
remains above 90 per cent. The general or overall decline in the Triad's share

may reflect efforts of developing economies to integrate globally and to
increase worldwide capacity and market share.
In general, then, the Triad's dominance of trade flows is reproduced in its

dominance of FDI flows, as the Triad is the principal source and host of FDl
flows.

2.3

FDIM&A

Cross-border mergers and acquisitions accounted for most FDI flows in the

late 1990s. More favourable tax conditions, relaxation of regulations and
labour laws, and a changing shareholder culture spurred dramatic increases in
cross-border M&A activity. From 1996 to 1999, as shown in Figure 4.4,
M&A inflows to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations increased over 280 per cent to US$718 billion, while
M&A outflows from the OECD nations increased over 200 per cent to US$767
billion. In 1999 alone, cross-border M&A inflows and outflows increased
approximately 50 per cent.
800,----------------.
600
400
200

o -'---'-1996

Source:

o

1997
Inward

1998
II Outward

1999

United Nations 1999 World Investment Report.

Figure 4.4

OEeD international M&A ($US billions)

As shown in Figure 4.5, the majority of M&A deals were concentrated in
the Triad. According to OECD data, in 1999 European companies led in
M&A deals. In the same year, the United Kingdom completed more acquisitions than any other nation, accounting for 30 per cent of global M&A value
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Figure 4.5

International M&A in OEeD countries: Triad share vftotal

(Wessel, 2000), while the United States continued to attract more M&A
purchasers than any other nation, capturing over 35 per cent of the value of
global M&A purchases,

2.4

Geographical and Sectoral Distribution of FDI Flows and CrossBorderM&A

The recent shift in FDI flows and M&A to the Triad nations relative to the
rest of the world is illustrated in greater detail in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 below,
which provide the geographical distribution of FDI inflows and cross-border
mergers and acquisitions. We chose not to combine these two measures (that

Table 4.2

Geographical distribution of FDI inflows (percentage of total
inflows)

Developed nations
European Union
Other European nations
North America
Other developed
Developing nations
Transitional nations
Source;

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

61.0
35.0
0.9
22.0
3.1
35.9
3.1

57.7
30.6
2.7
21.0
3.4
39.9
2.3

63.4
35.1
1.8
20.7
5.7
32.3
4.3

58.8
30.4
1.8
23.9
2.8
37.7
3.5

58.9
27.2
1.9
26.0
3.8
37.2
4.0

71.5
35.7
1.2
32.6
2.0
25.8
2.7

United Nations [999 World Investment Report.
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Table 4.3

Geographical distribution of cross-border M&As, by seller
(percentage of total)

Developed nations
European Union
Other European nations

North America
Other developed
Developing nations
Transitional nations
Source:

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

60.3
31.9
0.4
24.8
3.2
30.0
9.8

65.8
29.7
1.3
32.0
2.7
31.1
2.5

71.0
31.5
0.6
31.2
7.6
22.2
6.8

67.9
27.9
1.8
29.6
8.5
30.4
1.5

68.4
39.1
1.4
22.6
5.4
28.0
2.9

85.9
40.6
1.5
39.8
4.0
12.4
1.6

United Nations 1999 World Investment Report.

is to express M&A as a percentage of FOI flows, as is often done), as M&A
may be financed by means other than foreign direct investment, thereby
overstating the importance of M&A as a percentage of FDr. Nonetheless, the
data illustrate a significant increase in FDI inflows in the developed nations,

and in the Triad in particular, at the expense of developing nations. As in the
previous section, the increase in FDI corresponds with the dramatic increase
in M&A activity in the developed nations.
Table 4.2 indicates that the developed countries increased their share of
world FDI inflows by an additional 13 per cent and their share of world crossborder M&A by an additional I7 per cent at the expense of developing and
60

-

50

§ 40
u

~

"
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30
20
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0
1993

Source:

1997
1995
1996
1994
D Primary III Secondary II Tertiary

author's estimates.

Figure 4.6

Cross-border M&A by sector (percentage of total)

1998
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transitional nations. This trend is best understood in light of the sectoral
distribution of M&A deals. Figure 4.6 illustrates the distribution of crossborder M&A by primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors. The growing
importance of tertiary M&A reflects, in paa·ticular, recent deals in banking,
finance, and related services conducted almost exclusively among the developed nations.

2.5

The Relationship Between Foreign Direct Investment and Trade
Flows

Further international economic integration is likely to result from increases in
international production capacity due to larger capital flows rather than the
expansion of world exports resulting from the reduction of trade barriers.
What might this imply about the relationship between capital flows and trade
flows? Not too long ago, business economists believed global expansion
occurred along two relatively independent routes: through trade or through
foreign direct investruent. Global strategies were simple in that a firm could
expand internationally by exporting goods and services or by FDI and producing abroad. Recent theoretical and empirical research, however, suggests
that the relationship between trade and FDI is more complex, and that trade
and foreign direct investment complement each other. FOI may spur greater
aanounts of trade and trade may spur greater amounts of FOI.
Fantagne and Pajot (1997) provide estimates of the impact of bilateral FDI
flows and FDI stocks on bilateral trade flows, controlling for such things as
market distance, income levels, and market sizes. Their evidence suggests
that Japan's exports to the United States are 149 per cent higher than they
would have been in lieu of bilateral FOI flows, while US exports to Japan are
86 per cent higher than they would have been without the bilateral FOI flows.
FDI flows between Japan and the United States contribute to a bilateral trade
deficit for the United States, as a greater amount of exports to the United
States are generated than exports to Japan 2 In contrast, the bilateral FDI
relationships between Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom
generate approximately equal amounts of imports and exports, and do not
accordingly explain trade imbalances between the countries. 3 This shows that
FOI flows may either complement or substitute for trade flows, depending,
presumably, on the nature and purposes of the FDI. Below in Section 3, in
connection with our discussion of firm strategies, we consider three types of
cases in which FDI has specific implications for trade flows.

l
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3 UNDERSTANDING THE EVIDENCE IN TERMS OF THE
STRATEGIES OF TNCs
In this section we seek to explain the structural relationships underlying the
data on trade and investment in terms of the strategies of major firms in the
international economy. According to the 1999 World Investment Report (United
Nations Conference on Trade and Investment, 1999), though TNCs include
over 500,000 foreign affiliates established by some 60,000 parent companies,
a relatively small number of such firms have dominated international production since 1990, with the list of the top 100 firms virtually unchanged since
then, of which 90 per cent are from Triad countries. While the growth of the
largest TNCs does not tell the whole story about the globalization of production, their operations are central to it. They dominate world markets for oil,
minerals and agricultural products, and playa leading role in the globalization of manufacturing production and services. They also create production
and distribution networks in both Triad and non-Triad nations in which small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operate.

3.1

Change in the Relationship between Trade and Investment

The data above regarding the growth rates of trade and FDI over the period
1985-1999 provide evidence of a change in the relationship between trade
and investment in the world economy. Our understanding of this development
is that uncertain prospects for future trade negotiations have provided an
important stimulus for higher levels of FDI. Until the Uruguay Round, liberalization of international trade through the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and the WTO principally targeted the reduction of tariff barriers. But the success of these earlier negotiations created incentives for countries
to increase their reliance on non-tariff trade barriers as their principal means
of protection. Moreover, because non-tariff barriers are quantitatively and
qualitatively more complex than tariffs, multilateral negotiations for their
reduction have been, and are likely to continue to be, less successful than
negotiations over reductions in more traditional barriers. The protracted natnre of the Uruguay Round, which took up non-tariff barriers, and the largely
failed 1999 ministerial talks in Seattle seem to bear this out. Thus, both
because countries may rely more heavily on non-tariff barriers, and because
progress in reducing such barriers is likely to be slow, firms now have good
reason to look upon foreign investment as a key means of continuing expansion.
There may have been a period in the heyday of earlier GATT negotiations
when many believed that international economic integration would soon produce a world in which markets for goods, services, and factors of production
were perfectly integrated. It has now become apparent that the traditional
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paradigm of a world economy divided into nation states and segmented
markets will not be replaced by a borderless world in the foreseeable future
(cf. Helliwell, 1998). Trade flows will continue to encounter numerous obstacles, some created by national policies (tariffs and quotas, regulations, national
standards, competition policies, and government procurement); some by differences in culture, language, and custom; some by geography (affecting
transportation and communication); some by collusive practices of national
firms; and others by first entrant advantages (economies of scale, learning by
doing, control of distribution systems~ privileged access to inputs, and customer loyalties). All of these give rise to imperfect competition, market
segmentation, and international price and cost differences. But firms that
engage in FOI can take advantage of the opportunities of such segmentation
and thus arguably the dramatic growth in FOI since the mid-1980s reflects
the decision (and the ability) of TNCs to exploit foreign profit opportunities
and locational advantages not available through export strategies alone.
This conclusion may be understood in terms of two of the leading theories.
First, it recalls Hymer's emphasis on structural market imperfections and
market power approach (Hymer, 1976), more in regard to the advantages
these create for firms than regarding the removal of conflict between them.
But an emphasis on market segmentation also demonstrates the importance
of transactions costs, since firms encountering obstacles to trade that invest
abroad presumably regard transactions costs as greater than the costs of
relocation and organizing production through direct managerial control. Obstacles to trade, whether created or natural, cause transaction costs which
may be internalized through PDI. We agree with Buckley (Buckley, 1990,
p. 658) that 'the internalisation and market power explanations ... should not
be viewed as mutually exclusive or competing theories but should be combined to give a full and rich explanation of the growth of multinational firms.'
At the same time, we believe there are advantages in using the transactions
cost framework to account for both the concentration of world FOI in the
Triad (Section 2.2 above) and also the high degree of M&A in world FOI
(Section 2.3 above). The Hymer framework, with its focus on imperfect
competition, would lead us to expect developing countries to be an especially
important destination for FOI, since their markets tend to be less competitive
than those in developed countries. But the evidence indicates that developing
countries have received a relatively small share of PDI since the mid-1980s.
Further, if developing countries were an important destination for FDT, we
would expect a higher share of FOI to be greenfield investment, both because
of fewer opportunities in developing countries for M&A and because of
greater opportunities for investments targeting unexploited resources. But the
evidence indicates that greenfield investment, though still important, has
been relatively unimportant in world PDI since the mid-1980s. Thus in the
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section that follows we rely on a transactions cost framework to explain both

the concentration of FDI in the Triad countries and the importance of M&A
in total world POI. We use this framework in terms of search and deliberation
r

costs taken as a general form of transactions costs.

i

3.2

I

Search and Deliberation Costs as Transactions Costs

Another way of understanding the obstacles to trade described above is in
terms of cross-border information discontinuities that create significant search
and deliberation problems for TNCs (Rangan and Lawrence, 1999, ch. 4).
Within countries, information flows tend to be smoother and more homogeneous on account of shared market regulations and culture. Across borders,

information flows tend to be irregular and interrupted, so that there may be
significant interpretation problems, as different systems of regulation and
culture come into contact. In general. search problems arise when firms seek

to identify potential customers and suppliers as exchange partners. The costs
of search increase not only as potential exchange partners become more
physically dispersed, but also because across the international economy culture, language, and custom are different. In general, deliberation problems
arise in connection with firms' assessments of the reliability and trustworthiness of potential exchange partners. The costs of deliberation rise as it becomes
more difficult to reverse past decisions, implying that minimizing delibera-

tion costs calls for stable relationships with exchange partners. Clearly domestic
markets typically involve both lower search and deliberation costs for firms.
We explain this by saying that domestic markets involve lower costs because
firms are embedded (Granovetter, 1985) in established social, cultural, and
business networks that help them identify and evaluate those with whom they
do business. The lesson this implies is that success in international business

similarly depends upon firms becoming embedded in social, cultnral, and
business networks in foreign locations that reduce search and deliberation
costs. We use this insight to emphasize the importance to TNCs of internalizing search and deliberation costs as a general form of transactions costs

through cross-border M&A, POI, and strategic alliances.
The modern theory of the internationalization of markets in the literature

on international production (see Buckley and Casson, 1976) draws on Coase's
(1937) original contribution establishing transactions cost analysis. One important emphasis in this literature is on intangible assets such as technology

that are particularly costly to exchange in arm's-length transactions, and are
consequently important candidates for transactions costs internalization. In
the international economy, TNCs thus internalize their acquisitions of tech-

nology through investment in foreign research and development (R&D)
facilities, particularly through M&A with foreign firms that already possess
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desirable tacit capabilities that have been organizationally embedded in those
firms through collective learning processes. There is a spectrum of such
possible arrangements (cf. Kay, 1983). At one end are joint ventures and
decentralized TNCs in which internal markets regulated by transfer prices
have replaced external markets (Rugman, 1981). At the other end of the
spectrum are globally integrated multinationals with foreign affiliates in production and distribution in which control over all divisions and operations is
centralized and hierarchical (Williamson, 1975).
Acquisitions of technology, of course, account for only one category of
exchange partners for TNCs. Putting aside the transformation of business
through technological change, firms also have relationships with suppliers,
subcontractors, distributors, labour and management personnel, consultants,
and financial institutions in carrying out routine operations. All of these
relationships are likely to differ in important respects in foreign country
locations as compared to home country locations. The 'foreign-ness' of these
relationships, however, is much the same as relationships aimed at technology acquisition. Just as many important technologies involve intangible assets
and are embedded in firms through collective learning processes, so the
relationships with most exchange prutners, domestic or foreign, presuppose
tacit understandings and expectations that guide these relationships and get
embedded over an extended period of time.
When films operate in their home locations, they often take these tacit
features of exchange for granted. In foreign locations, however, they become
sharply aware of the role that tacit understandings and expectations play
between business partners. TNCs, we suggest, are firms that have learned
how to identify the implicit features of exchange relationships in foreign
countries, and then fonn relationships with suppliers, subcontractors, distributors, and so on. In doing so, they internalize transactions costs involved
in operating supply and distribution chains outside of their horne countries,
where those transactions costs might be labelled business and economic
network transactions costs, and are closely associated with search and deliberation costs of doing business there. As Rugman puts it (Rugman, 2000,
pp. 215ff), TNCs serve as 'flagship firms' by operating at the hub of a business network or cluster. Long-term contracts are established with four basic
kinds of partners - key suppliers, key customers, key competitors, and the
non-business infrastructure - and the whole constitutes a relatively settled
business system that internalizes an entire structure of transactions costs, not
just transactions costs on a partner-by-partner basis.
The behaviour of US TNCs in manufacturing is illustrative. Although in
1990 the top 50 US TNCs accounted for nearly 40 per cent of US manufacturing exports, exports were not a large share of these firms' overall foreign
sales, which were carried out by these firms' foreign affiliates (Fortune, 1991,

--"--~----------------------------------"-----------------------------------------------
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p" 59)" In general (see Rangan and Lawrence, 1999, pp.34ft), US TNCs
appear to ship about half of all their exports on an intrafinn basis to their
affiliates abroad. Moreover, a very significant share of these exports are
inputs awaiting further value-added rather than finished products ready for
sale. Some might suppose from this that these US firms have thus simply
located production facilities in other countries, and carry out manufacturing
operations there with home produced inputs. In fact, however, US input
content in sales by foreign affiliates in developed economics is typically low,
now amounting to about 10 per cent or less (Rangan and Lawrence, 1999,
p. 65)4 Thus, US TNCs rely on their developed country foreign affiliates not home exports - for foreign sales, and focus on intrafirm exports of inputs
to those affiliates, but then rely primarily upon local sourcing of inputs in
generating products for final sale. We believe this illustrates the embeddedness
of TNCs, especially in developed economies in which the pervasiveness of
search and deliberation costs requires that firms internalize transactions costs
on a systemic, wide-ranging basis.

The point stands out more clearly when we compare the practices of US
TNCs in developing countries. While these firms rely on their foreign affiliates
and less and less on home exports for their foreign sales, when we consider
intrafirm exports of inputs to those affiliates, it turns out that TNCs depend less
on local sQurcing in developing countries. Thus, US input content in 1982 for a

selection of developing economies ranges between IS and 50 per cent (Rangan
and Lawrence, 1999, p. 83). In our view, this reflects the lesser extent to which
developing economies have established complex social and economic networks

into which US TNCs must insert themselves in order to internalize search and
deliberation transaction costs and carry out profitable transactions. Clearly
business and economic networks exist in such economies. However, their number

and variety of possible exchange partners do not compare with networks in
developed economies. Thus we suppose that search and deliberation costs are
lower in these economies, so that the expansion of TNCs into these economies
reflects less the need to internalize such costs and perhaps more the pursuit of
market power advantages a La Hymer. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the

general pattern since 1982 is rising local content in US TNC foreign affiliate
production. This suggests that the development of those economies, plus possibly technological spillover effects on local business networks (see below), is
slowly creating a business environment for TNCs in developing economies
guided by the same factors as those in developed ones.

We would not want to suggest by the analysis above, however, that the
social and economic frameworks into which TNCs enter are static in nature

and unaffected by this entry. A long literature dating from the earliest studies
of TNCs has examined the transformative effects these firms have on local
economies. Consider the case of technology transfer. Dunning (1958) pio-
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neered this work in his study of the operations of British affiliates of US
TNCs as compared to their British-owned counterparts. The former were
generally more successful than the latter, and Dunning argued that this was
due to the capacity of TNCs to transfer often intangible assets (technology,
marketing, managerial skills) to their affiliates. Moreover, after a time the
British firms were able to catch up with the US affiliates, demonstrating the
spillover character of the original transfers.
One way that this spillover may occur is through transformation of TNCsupplier and TNC-distributor relationships. Seeking low-cost input supplies
and efficient distribution networks, TNCs transfer organizational methods
and technologies to their business partners, who then re-employ these methods and technologies in their business relationships with domestic firms. The
latter then change their methods of organization and technologies, and so on.
Thus FDI has interrelated transformative effects on host countries' technology levels and systems of business organization. Not surprisingly, developing
countries have sought to take advantage of this by imposing local content
requirements on TNCs (now generally banned by the WTO under the Agreement on Trade-Related Measures or TRIMs). Other 'downstream' spillovers
include local human capital development (Borenszstein et al., 1994). Finally,
a recent OECD study (2000, p. 25) emphasizes the transformative effects of
TNC activity in terms of the self-perpetuating nature of FDl. Not only do
competing TNCs tend to follow one another into foreign locations, but they
are also likely to induce local investments in supply chains and other business
service providers. This is important for understanding the emerging role for
SMEs operating in conjunction with TNCs in developed countries.
How, then, do these conclusions relate to the structural trends presented in
Section 2 above? What stands out is the concentration of trade and investment in the Triad, the importance of M&A, and (to a lesser extent) the rising
importance of tertiary production in FDI activity. Based on the discussion
above, our argument regarding these trends is two-sided. First, though the
obstacles to FDI as eontrasted with domestic investment place a speeial
burden on TNCs to overcome cost disadvantages in entering foreign locations, that burden may be eased through exploitation of search and deliberation
transaction cost savings when these firms succeed in embedding themselves
in foreign business and economic networks. We thus conclude that because
these networks are more highly developed in the Triad, the opportunities for
expansion there are greater. Second, once embedded in these networks, our
analysis suggests that there is considerable promise of profitable returns on
TNC investments, because highly developed business networks offer firms
the flexibility to regularly adjust their commitments with exchange partners,
which should be to their advantage. We believe the level of M&A FDI in the
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Triad particularly reflects this. The embeddedness/transactions cost framework, then, takes us a considerable way toward understanding firm strategies
responding to and underlying recent structural changes in the world economy.

3.3

Firm Strategies Producing FD I and Trade Flow Linkages

With our conclusions about TNC strategies developed above, we return to the
topic of whether trade and investment are substitutes andlor complements,
and describe three cases in which firm investment decisions have implications for countries' exports and imports. The importance of the topic lies in
how countries assess the costs and benefits of liberalizing capital flows when
the effects include changes in their trade accounts. In our view, one obstacle
to successful international negotiations over capital flows liberalization is
uncertainty regarding whether higher FOI creates trade deficits. The case has
been made more frequently for capital-exporting countries, but it has also
been made for capital-importing countries. Here we do not provide a comprehensive analysis of the subject, but rather suggest by our three cases that the
effects of FDI on trade depend upon the purposes for which FDI is carried
out. Trade and investment may thus be substitutes andlor complements for
one another according to the circumstances involved, and we may accordingly rule out the impact of FDI on countries' trade balances as a policy
concern.
First, consider perhaps the simplest type of relationship between FDI and
trade. A finn moves production from a home location to a foreign location,
and replaces its home exports with foreign affiliate sales. The home country
trade account may be more or less unaffected, if some home input suppliers
now export to the new foreign location, and prior imports of inputs to the
home location now fall. The host country may lose exports if it was an input
supplier to the original location of production in the home country, and see
some added input imports, but may also gain exports if the new plant employs new technologies that make it possible to add capacity to export. Thus
the overall effects depend on the character of the original investment, and
there does not appear to be a general relationship between FOI and trade.
Second, consider the case of a developed country firm that moves labourintensive production to a foreign location, and then imports the output for
final assembly at home. Since final output is now cheaper, the export capability of the finn is enhanced. The horne country may thus increase its imports
and also its exports. At the same time, the country to which the labourintensive production was relocated now has higher exports. But if, as is not
unlikely, it purchases the now relatively cheaper output of the home country
firm, then its imports rise as well. Thus the ultimate impact on trade of FDI
again depends upon the kind of FDI and the circumstances involved.
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Third, consider the trade effects of using FDI to outsource stages of the
production process in pursuit of cost advantages in foreign locations (Feenstra,
1998; Davis and Daniels, 2000). Though attention is often focused on the
stages of production that leave a horne country, equally important for understanding the trade effects of FDI are those stages of production that it retains.
When a country retains stages of the production process in which it lacks
comparative advantage, the possible comparative advantage it possesses in
other stages may be concealed by a focus on whether the final product is cost
competitive. Conversely, when a country relocates stages of production in
which it is not cost competitive, say, simple assembly in developed countIies,
then those remaining stages in which it is especially cost competitive, say,
marketing and design stages, become a more obvious source of export earnings. In these circumstances, imports rise when the output of foreign assembly
operations is brought back to the home country to produce the final product,
but exports may also rise if firms exploit the foreign marketability of business
services in which they have comparative advantage. The increasing importance of tertiary cross-border M&A may reflect this re-positioning of firms in
developed countries in the higher value-added stages of the production process. Thus again, the ultimate impact on trade of FDI depends on the character
of the investment.
3.4

Policy Toward FDI and TNCs

TNCs have been characterized as firms that have shed their home-nation
identities and operate essentially as stateless entities (Ohmae, 1990). This has
led to a concern that TNCs will locate operations wherever in the world they
are able to minimize costs, making it increasingly difficult for nations to tax
TNCs, thus resulting in a shifting oftax burden from capital to labour (Rodrik,
1997). The implication of these views and arguments is that further liberalization of regulations on capital flows and entry of foreign firms into domestic
markets and on FD!, such as was involved in the efforts within the OECD to
develop an MAl, is undesirable (see, for example, Braunstein and Epstein,
1999).' On the other side of the debate, Swank (1999) has argued that international capital mobility and the internationalization of capital markets need
not jeopardize the institutions of the welfare state, since democratic institutions that facilitate collective representation of interests may structure
governmental responses to TNC strategies. Relatedly, others have argued that
the development of new forms of corporate governance as promoted by a
variety of NOOs can also help accommodate the international economy to
significant social and environmental needs (for example, Nadkarni, 1999).
To sort out this debate, we first emphasize the difference between FD! and
portfolio investment, then discuss the difference between national competi-
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tiveness and the competitiveness of a nation's firms, and finally close with an
argument in favour of the ultimate objectives of the MAL OUf argument is
that because FDI has a stabilizing influence on national economies, and
because the competitiveness of nations is enhanced by inward FDI flows,
careful liberalization of long-term capital flows, such as was intended by the
MAl, is desirable. However, the venue and form of such an agreement remain
an issue.

3.5

FDI versus Portfolio Investment

It is important to emphasize the economic difference between portfolio and
FDI flows. Portfolio flows as a non-ownership, liquid form of investment, are
easily reversible, whereas FDI as a relatively illiquid, ownership fonn of investment typically involves long-term commitment. Significant portfolio inflows
can, and often do, overwhelm a nation with an inefficient or under-developed
system of financial intennediaries, and the allocation of this new source of
liquidity may often be economically unsound. Worse, as learned in the 199495 Mexican and 1997 East Asian financial crises, when portfolio flows slow or
reverse, the system of intermediaries then often becomes illiquid and a financial crisis may ensue (see Chang and Velasco, 1998). In the case of Mexico and
the rest of the western hemisphere's emerging economies, portfolio flows increased relative to FDI from 1990 to 1994. Following the crisis that began in
December 1994, the outflow of portfolio capital resulted in a 112 per cent
decline and overall negative net portfolio flows for the region. When portfolio
flows reverse in one nation, they often trigger a crisis in the entire region, as
seen in the cases of Mexico and Thailand. Empirical work by Glick and Rose
(1998) indicates that currency crises affect 'clusters' of nations, working through
established trade channels. Hence, over-reliance on portfolio capital can be
destabilizing for individual countries and entire regions.
In contrast, FDI appears to be a stabilizing factor. When TNCs establish
foreign affiliates or enter into strategic alliances, they seek long-term commitments. Search costs are reduced, because participation in host country
networks transfers information within the network regarding customers and
suppliers that is not available to firms engaged in arm's-length trade. Deliberation costs are reduced, when long-term relationships reduce the need to
regularly evaluate potential exchange partners. Thus one would not expect
TNCs to enter and exit foreign countries with high degrees of frequency.
Indeed, as it is more difficult to enter into foreign business and market
networks than in home countries, exit from established facilities and operations seems less likely in foreign locations. Against the argument that tax
costs create footloose TNCs, it seems that tax costs are a relatively minor
element in decision-making regarding the location of production. FDI and
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TNCs, then, appear to have a stabilizing influence on the economies in which

they locate, bringing income and employment to those economies.
3.6

National Competitiveness versus a Nation's Firms'
Competitiveness

Despite arguments that TNCs have dissociated themselves from their national

origins, many still believe that national economic strength is linked to the
success of a country's TNCs. Thus whether or not these firms are internationally competitive is an important measure of whether nations are competitive

in the world economy. But there are good reasons to think this emphasis on a
nation's firms is misplaced. Reich (1990) asks us to consider the positive
impact that foreign finns have on a country's employment and income when

they locate production or distribution subsidiaries in that country. Of course
the opposite impact occurs when foreign finns leave a country, but Reich
thinks that seeing exit as an inevitable consequence of entry misconceives the
nature of FDI. Firms invest in foreign markets because they perceive advan-

tages to doing so: skilled workforces, good distribution networks, developed
supply chains, access to finance, and so on. A country that invests in education, research, training, and infrastructure, then, can expect to continually

attract FDI, enabling it to maintain high levels of employment and income. If
we add the benefits of technology spillovers discussed above, we might
imagine a virtuous spiral of growth and investment, whereby domestic investment and FDI continually reinforce one another.
Reich's argument is mostly pitched at a macroeconomic level. Our argument emphasizes the factors affecting firms' decision-making regarding where

they wish to locate their subsidiaries and develop strategic alliances. In virtue
of the importance of business and economic networks in a foreign venture,

firms will generally be reluctant to abandon commitments to an interlocked
complex of exchange partners, both because of the original cost of building
up that set of commitments and because of the anticipated cost of having to
re-establish similar commitments elsewhere. Seen in this light, Reich's recommendation that nations pay less attention to who owns finns and more
attention to creating the economic conditions in which all firms will prosper,
is tantamount to a call for governments to help bear the cost of setting up
such networks. In effect, Reich recorrnnends that governments socialize search

and deliberation costs for firms (foreign and domestic) through public goods
expenditures, in order to help create national and regional business networks
that rival those elsewhere. 6

One important implication of this is that FDI appears to have a greater
stabilizing influence on national economies than some of its stronger propo-

nents have supposed. Indeed, FDI may be argued to move more inertly than
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even domestic long-term investment flows, since domestic firms inherit a
variety of home country advantages that enable them to move across different
national business networks, providing them with consistently lower search
and deliberation costs than foreign firms have in those same networks. To be
competitive, then, foreign firms need to be more successful than domestic
firms in internalizing search and deliberation costs, and consequently they
need to be more committed to building up their involvement in the networks
in which they participate. TNCs, then, should be quite reluctaut to exit from
foreign locations in which they set up operations, and when they do find this
their best course of action, it is likely that there are deeper causes at root
having to do more with national economic policies than the liberalization of
long-term capital flows.

3.7

TheMAI

There is currently no comprehensive set of international rules on FDI or the
operations of TNCs comparable to the international rules for trade embodied
in the WTO, and progress in multilateral negotiations on the subject has been
modest at best. Issues relating to host country policies toward FDI and TNCs
were first raised in GATT discussions in 1981, and by the time of the WTO
Uruguay Round a limited set of trade-related investment measures (TRIMs)
principally concerning local content restrictions had been agreed upon. Somewhat more success in the Uruguay Round carne about in connection with
trade-related intellectual property policies (TRIPs), perhaps because developing countries were prepared to encourage technology transfers from developed
countries. However, the perception of many in the industrial countries was
that further progress in liberalizing capital flows was unlikely to occur within
the WTO on account of the different interests of developed and developing
countries (Graham, 1996). Accordingly, in 1994 an effort began to work out
an agreement on investment within the OEeD, where it was believed there
was greater commonality of interest. The collapse of negotiations over the
MAl in late 1998 thus generated considerable pessimism not only about
progress in liberalizing capital flows, but also in terms of where efforts ought
to be initiated. All now seem to agree that limited negotiations hold the only
prospect. Two proposals have been advanced for returning to the WTO as the
proper venue for such negotiations, and relying on the WTO's 'built-in'
agenda to avoid the need for authorizing any new initiatives.
Moran (1998) has argued for restricting the agenda to performance requirements and investment incentives within the context of the existing TRIMs
agreement. The former are of particular concern to developed countries and
the latter are of particular concern to developing countries. Thus in principle
there is potential for an agreement with reciprocal concessions. But it is by
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no means clear that the two sets of countries will be able to bargain as blocs.
For example, developed countries include federal and non-federal forms of
government. The former, p31ticularly the United States, have insisted Ihat
tbey cannot compel subfederal governments (states) to restrict investment
incentives. In addition, a number of developing countries appear unwilling to
compromise on perfonnance requirements.
Sauve and Wilkie (2000) have argued that a restricted agenda can be
pursued through the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
by applying national treatment in services. They contend that the current
GATS agreement is quite limited in scope, and that most countries' laws
and policies that are inconsistent with national treatment are to be found in
service industries covered by GATS (ef. R'ugman and Gestrin, 1994). Graham
(2000) argues in favour of this initiative on the grounds that Ihe chief
application of Ihe proposal would be to developed countries, between which
it might be more realistic to seek agreements on the matter, and there
appears to be a very considerable business constituency interested in services liberalization.
We favour progress on both these fronts, but think it is also possible to
extend piecemeal refonn in venues additional to the WTO. In his diagnosis of
Ihe Asian financial crisis, Eichengreen (1999) argues for a reform of international financial intermediary and corporate practices that would increase
banking and corporate transparency and disclosure through enhanced accounting and auditing standards, establish capital requirements for foreign
lending in line with risk, and generate new expectations regarding corporate
governance. But Eichengreen does not suggest that the International Monetary Fund or any other single international organization take on responsibility
for all these changes. Rather, he believes a collection of private-sector bodies
with appropriate expertise already exists, including: the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), the International Organization of
Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), Committee J of Ihe International Bar
Association (regarding bankruptcy laws), Ihe International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO), and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
(also cf. Daniels, 2000a, p. 127).
Reform in the intelnational financial architecture generated by these
groups and organizations would not in itself constitute a liberalization of
international investment. But such reform would most likely create a more
stable international climate for investment. On the one hand, such reform
would ease information asymmetries that impede FDl. On the other hand,
to the extent that national currencies were more stable as a result of such
reforms, investment risk would be reduced. Thus, if only modest gains are
now expected from negotiations over investment carried on in multilateral
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organizations such as the WTO, these potential improvements in international financial architecture may by comparison be important. There is a
further reason to emphasize this avenue. Since the groups and organizations
above are private-sector bodies, their deliberations and decisions are unlikely to cause the sort of conflict that has been associated with the WTO.
Moreover, should these groups and organizations be subject to public scrutiny, it is still arguable that their recommendations would not be controversial.

SUMMARY
In this chapter we present a collection of stylized facts regarding structural
changes and developments in the world economy in connection with trade,
PDI, M&A, and their distribution across the TIiad and the ROW, and then
provide an explanation of TNC strategies responding to and underlying these
trends that emphasizes the transactions costs savings available to TNCs that
become embedded in host economies. In our view, this picture provides good
grounds for supposing that FDI and trade are substitutes and complements,
and thus that the impact of FDI on trade balances should not be a primary
policy concern. In the concluding section, then, we discuss policy toward
FDI, and argue that the embeddedness of TNCs makes PDI a stabilizing
factor in national economies. Despite this positive case, progress in liberalizing international capital flows has not been significant. We favour a set of
piecemeal reforms, including changes in international financial architecture
that stem from private-sector bodies.

NOTES
1.

Globalization should be understood in terms of the interdependence of trade and investment within as well as between regions (Rugman, 2000).
2. This relationship between FDI and trade in the case of Japan and the United States may be
transient, since Japan appears to be moving from a bank-based system of corporate governance to a more securities-based system - a change which would have implications for
Japanese FDI and trade (see Ozawa, 2000).
3. However, the FDI relationship between the United Kingdom and Canada results in slightly
lower trade flows than would have occurred without FDI taking place.
4. The exceptions are Canada and Japan. Nor is the US case unreflective of the behaviour of
non-US TNCs, with foreign content in sales by their US affiliates also in the neighbourhood of 10 per cent.
5. Note that the issues often raised in connection with FDI to developing countries of labour
exploitation and environmental dnmping are not relevant to the MAl, which was an agreement being negotiated between developed countries.
6. Here we see one of the important dimensions of Rugman's (2000) characterization of
globalization as a process of regionalization.
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